

### AMENDMENTS TO CLAIMS

Claim 1 (original): A method for verifying, by a verifier, that a prover has access to a private key associated with a public key  $K_p$ , the method comprising:

the prover sending an identification message to the verifier, the identification message comprising an indication of an identity of the prover, the indication of the identity including an indication of  $K_p$ ;

performing an identification round, the identification round comprising:

the verifier choosing a challenge  $Q$  and a padding string  $X$ ;

the verifier sending an initialization message to the prover, the initialization message comprising a disguised form  $Y$  produced by applying a public disguising function  $F_p$  to  $Q$  and  $X$ ,  $Y$  being equal to  $F_p(Q, X)$ ;

the prover computing a random number  $R$  by applying a private disguising function  $F_v$  to  $Y$ ,  $R$  being equal to  $F_v(Y)$ ;

the prover sending a commit message to the verifier, the commit message comprising a disguised form of  $R$  produced by applying a function  $f$  to  $R$ , the disguised form of  $R$  being equal to  $f(R)$ ;

the verifier sending a challenge message to the prover, the challenge message comprising the challenge  $Q$  and the padding string  $X$ ;

the prover verifying that  $Y = F_p(Q, X)$ ;

the prover sending a response message to the verifier, the response message comprising a response  $A$ , the response  $A$  satisfying a predicate relationship  $\text{Pred}(A, Q, f(R), K_p)$ , wherein satisfying the predicate relationship provides an indication that the prover has access to the private key; and

the verifier verifying that  $A$  satisfies the predicate relationship  $\text{Pred}(A, Q, f(R), K_p)$ ; and

the verifier determining that the prover has access to the private key based on a result of the performing step.

Claim 2 (original): A method according to claim 1 and also comprising:

subsequent to the prover verifying that  $Y = F_p(Q, X)$ , using the value  $F_p(Q, X)$  instead of the value  $Y$  of the verifier sending step in all subsequent operations using  $Y$ .

Claim 3 (original): A method according to claim 1 and wherein the performing step is performed iteratively a plurality of times, and

the verifier determining step includes determining based on a plurality of results each associated with one of the plurality of times that the performing step is performed.

Claim 4 (original): A method according to claim 1 and wherein the disguising function  $F_p$  comprises a one-way hash function.

Claim 5 (original): A method according to claim 3 and wherein the disguising function  $F_p$  comprises a one-way hash function.

Claim 6 (original): A method according to claim 1 and wherein the private disguising function  $F_v$  comprises a one-way hash function.

Claim 7 (original): A method according to claim 3 and wherein the private disguising function  $F_v$  comprises a one-way hash function.

Claim 8 (original): A method according to claim 1 and wherein the public disguising function  $F_p$  comprises a public key dependent disguising function  $F_{pp}$  dependent, in part, on the public key  $K_p$ , and

$Y$  is equal to  $F_{pp}(Q, X, K_p)$ , and

the prover verifying step comprises the prover verifying that  $Y = F_{pp}(Q, X, K_p)$ .

Claim 9 (original): A method according to claim 3 and wherein the public disguising function  $F_p$  comprises a public key dependent disguising function  $F_{pp}$  dependent, in part, on the public key  $K_p$ , and

$Y$  is equal to  $F_{pp}(Q,X,K_p)$ , and  
the prover verifying step comprises the prover verifying that  
 $Y=F_{pp}(Q,X,K_p)$ .

Claim 10 (original): A method according to claim 1 and wherein the function  $f$  comprises  $R^2$  modulo  $N$ .

Claim 11 (original): A method according to claim 3 and wherein the function  $f$  comprises  $R^2$  modulo  $N$ .

Claim 12 (cancelled)

Claim 13 (cancelled)

Claim 14 (original): A system for verifying access to a private key associated with a public key  $K_p$ , the system comprising:

a verifier; and

a prover comprising a disguising unit,

wherein the prover is operative to send an identification message to the verifier, the identification message comprising an indication of an identity of the prover, the indication of the identity including an indication of  $K_p$ , and

the prover and the verifier together are operative to perform an identification round, the identification round comprising:

the verifier choosing a challenge  $Q$  and a padding string  $X$ ;

the verifier sending an initialization message to the prover, the initialization message comprising a disguised form  $Y$  produced by applying a public disguising function  $F_p$  to  $Q$  and  $X$ ,  $Y$  being equal to  $F_p(Q,X)$ ;

the prover computing a random number  $R$  by applying a private disguising function  $F_v$  to  $Y$  in the disguising unit,  $R$  being equal to  $F_v(Y)$ ;

the prover sending a commit message to the verifier, the commit message comprising a disguised form of  $R$  produced by applying a function  $f$  to  $R$ , the disguised form of  $R$  being equal to  $f(R)$ ;

the verifier sending a challenge message to the prover, the challenge message comprising the challenge  $Q$  and the padding string  $X$ ;

the prover verifying that  $Y = F_p(Q, X)$ ;

the prover sending a response message to the verifier, the response message comprising a response  $A$ , the response  $A$  satisfying a predicate relationship  $\text{Pred}(A, Q, f(R), K_p)$ , wherein satisfying the predicate relationship provides an indication that the prover has access to the private key; and

the verifier verifying that  $A$  satisfies the predicate relationship  $\text{Pred}(A, Q, f(R), K_p)$ , and

the verifier is operative to determine that the prover has access to the private key based on a result of the identification round.

Claim 15 (original): A prover for use with a verifier for verifying access to a private key associated with a public key  $K_p$ , the prover comprising:

a disguising unit,

wherein the prover is operative to send an identification message to the verifier, the identification message comprising an indication of an identity of the prover, the indication of the identity including an indication of  $K_p$ , and

the prover and the verifier together are operative to perform an identification round, the identification round comprising:

the verifier choosing a challenge  $Q$  and a padding string  $X$ ;

the verifier sending an initialization message to the prover, the initialization message comprising a disguised form  $Y$  produced by applying a public disguising function  $F_p$  to  $Q$  and  $X$ ,  $Y$  being equal to  $F_p(Q, X)$ ;

the prover computing a random number  $R$  by applying a private disguising function  $F_v$  to  $Y$  in the disguising unit,  $R$  being equal to  $F_v(Y)$ ;

the prover sending a commit message to the verifier, the commit message comprising a disguised form of  $R$  produced by applying a function  $f$  to  $R$ , the disguised form of  $R$  being equal to  $f(R)$ ;

the verifier sending a challenge message to the prover, the challenge message comprising the challenge  $Q$  and the padding string  $X$ ;

the prover verifying that  $Y = F_p(Q, X)$ ;

the prover sending a response message to the verifier, the response message comprising a response A, the response A satisfying a predicate relationship  $\text{Pred}(A, Q, f(R), K_p)$ , wherein satisfying the predicate relationship provides an indication that the prover has access to the private key; and

the verifier verifying that A satisfies the predicate relationship  $\text{Pred}(A, Q, f(R), K_p)$ , and

the verifier is operative to determine that the prover has access to the private key based on a result of the identification round.

Claim 16 (new): A method according to claim 1 and wherein the padding string X comprises randomly chosen padding.

Claim 17 (new): A system according to claim 14 and wherein the padding string X comprises randomly chosen padding.

Claim 18 (new): A prover according to claim 15 and wherein the padding string X comprises randomly chosen padding.